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Sexually Transmitted Diseases: A Courtroom Epidemic 
James B. Damiano 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that there are 
approximately 19 million new sexually transmitted disease (STD) infections each year. This 
costs the U.S. health care system over $16 billion annually and costs individuals even more in 
terms of acute and long-term health consequences.
1
 These remarkable figures necessitate a 
reassessment of tort law's proper function in determining how to handle the impact on our 
society and legal system, that sexually transmitted diseases cause, as this costly wave of sex 
tort litigation sweeps across the nation.
 2
  
Sexually transmitted diseases remain a major public health challenge in the U.S., and 
the outrageous costs incurred by this epidemic are taking a heavy toll on not only the health 
care system, but the legal system as well.  The increase in the litigation filed by plaintiffs who 
are seeking damages as a result of unknowingly being infected with a STD has been growing 
over the past twenty years, and will likely continue to grow commensurate with the 
proliferation of sexual disease.
3
 
Despite the literature and public announcements circulated in this area outlining the 
seriousness and prevalence of these diseases, many individuals take little heed and are reckless 
in their actions, failing to take the proper prophylactic measures to avoid transmission to their 
                                               
1
 See http://www.cdc.gov/std/stats09/trends2009.pdf. 
2
 This paper will focus on more serious diseases that are either incurable or life threatening. Curable 
diseases present issues of mootness and will not be addressed in this paper.  
3
 Deana A. Pollard, Sex Torts, 91 MINN. L. REV. 769, 793-94 (2007). 
 1 
sexual partners.
4
 This has led to numerous instances where the courts have, in effect, been 
asked to attach tort liability to the natural results of otherwise knowing and consensual sexual 
relationships. To help shed some light on this area of tort law, the following hypothetical may 
be helpful in illustrating the complexities that the courts are being presented with in this area of 
tort litigation.  
Anthony, a 21 year-old college senior gets invited to a friend’s dorm to enjoy a night of 
wine and cheese to celebrate their upcoming graduation in May, 2009. While enjoying his 
wine, he sets his eyes upon Maria, a stunning young woman majoring in pre-law and aspiring 
to be an attorney. After obtaining some information about Maria, he approaches her and 
initiates a conversation with her.  The conversation turns into the two of them mutually 
deciding to become intimate with each other.    
Before initiating any sexual intercourse, Maria, who always practices safe sex, asks 
Anthony if he has any sexually transmitted diseases that he could infect her with.  Anthony, 
having never been tested, but honestly and reasonably believing he did not have an STD 
replies, “None that I know of.”5 As a result of that discussion, they engaged in unprotected 
sexual intercourse. Anthony based his belief on that fact that he had very few sexual partners 
throughout college, and as far as he knew, his sexual partners also had very few sexual 
partners.
6
 Maria was very conscious about the spread of disease and had been tested regularly 
                                               
4
 See M.A. Catchpole, Continuing Transmission of Sexually Transmitted Diseases Among Patients 
Infected with HIV-1 Attending Genitourinary Medicine Clinics in England and Wales, 312 B.M.J. 539 
(1996).  
In these studies, a considerable proportion of patients infected with HIV-1 and a substantial numbers of 
homosexual or bisexual men attending these clinics continue to practice unsafe sex despite being aware 
of their infection with HIV-1. 
5
 Whether Anthony had a duty to “know” will be explored in Part II, infra.  
6
 Courts have attempted to determine whether a lack of knowledge is a valid defense.  See Part III, infra. 
 2 
in the past, all of which testing was negative. Anthony and Maria remained friends after 
college, but had no further sexual relations after that one encounter.     
In September, 2009, Maria began law school. However, because of her busy schedule, 
she had not kept up with the regular STD testing that she had in the past.  In addition to her 
busy schedule, Maria did not feel the need to be tested because she did not have any other 
sexual encounters since the last one with Anthony, in May, 2009.  Maria finally made some 
time to get tested in July, 2011.  Expecting a normal result, Maria was shocked when her doctor 
called her and informed her that her results came back positive for herpes.  Her reaction 
stemmed from the fact that she had no symptoms of any STD and that she hasn’t had any 
sexual partners since Anthony. 
 Infuriated, Maria contacted Anthony and informed him that he gave her a sexually 
transmitted disease and that she would be seeking restitution for the short and long term 
damage this infection has, and will continue to cause her.  Anthony, who was working as a 
paralegal for a small law firm that specialized in personal injury litigation realized that it has 
been over two years since they had any contact, and told Maria that she “didn’t stand a chance 
because the statute of limitations on matters like this is two years and she waited too long!”7 
After doing some research, Maria realized that the statute did, in fact, bar actions brought after 
two years but wondered if there were any exceptions to the strict reading of the statute.  She 
was nervous and began to think it may have been her fault because she was negligent for 
believing him and not requiring that he get tested before agreeing to engage in sexual 
intercourse with him. Maria was concerned and asked herself, Was it her fault? Did she assume 
                                               
7
 Issues concerning the statute of limitations will be further explored in Part V, infra. 
 3 
the risk when she had sex with him?
8
 What can she do to protect herself, and where she would 
even begin to look to find out.  Other questions were also raised, such as, should Anthony have 
known about his condition? and, “is it all, or any part, Anthony’s fault? Lastly, Maria was 
concerned with the public humiliation she would bring upon herself and her family if she had to 
bring this lawsuit into the eyes of the public court system?
9
 
To help explain some of the questions raised throughout this scenario, and to establish 
whether one sexual partner owes a duty to the other, the outline herein below is separated as 
follows:
10
  
a.  Part I explores recent statistical data gathered by the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention in the rapidly growing area of Sexually Transmitted Diseases in America.
11
  
b.  Part II explains the current negligence paradigm, and why it is the most 
frequently alleged claim.   
c.  Part III examines some of the most commonly asserted defenses. In this section, 
it is evident that courts are having a difficult time addressing these cases because many courts 
are seeing them as a case of first impression.  
d. Part IV explains the overdue advances in the area of interspousal immunity and 
presents an argument for a more uniform approach to be applied across the country.  
                                               
8
 The defense of assumption of risk is explored in Part III, infra.  
9
 The negative stigma associated with these diseases as well as the reluctance of Americans to get tested 
is explored in Part I, infra. 
10
 This paper will simply focus on Sexually Transmitted Diseases and the tort law implications. This 
paper will not address any criminal liability associated with such acts, including fraudulent 
misrepresentation and battery, the most prevalent criminal charges in these types of cases. 
11
 The data in this section applies to the nation as a whole. No specific demographic was targeted in the 
data provided by the Centers for Disease Control. 
 4 
e. Part V addresses the various issues concerning the statute of limitations in this 
area and presents a basis as to why a more liberal application of the doctrine would further the 
goals of tort law. 
In conclusion, the contention that the courts have failed to address this topic properly 
will be propounded, as well as how this failure has fashioned a tort law system that is unable to 
meet its ultimate goals. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 I. A Brief Statistical Background On America’s Increasing STD Rates  
Sexually transmitted diseases remain a veiled epidemic in the United States that present 
enormous health and economic consequence to our nation and our society at large. Due to the 
negative biological and social stigma associated with these diseases, many Americans are 
reluctant to address sexual health issues, and as a result, avoid regular and proper testing.
12
 This 
laissez faire attitude is the leading factor that cause Americans to remain oblivious of any 
disease they have been exposed to or may be carrying.  This ignorance leads people to believe 
that this epidemic has no effect on them.  However, all people have an interest in STD 
prevention because all communities are impacted by STDs and all individuals directly, or 
indirectly pay for the costs of these diseases. There are many obstacles to effective prevention 
efforts, which includes confronting and remedying the reluctance of American society to 
openly face and challenge issues surrounding STDs.  It is also necessary that the court create a 
uniform approach to encourage more socially responsible behavior.  While the process of 
preventing STDs must be a collaborative one, America should also utilize its court system to 
                                               
12
 Similar to Anthony above, one cannot assume they do not carry a disease based solely on their prior 
sexual history of few partners. 
 5 
initiate a successful national initiative to confront and prevent STDs, as well as to protect 
individuals who have been unknowingly infected by them. 
To keep American’s informed of this public health outbreak, every year the CDC 
publishes a report of national data on gonorrhea, chlamydia and syphilis.   In its report,
13
 the 
CDC based its data on state and local STD case reports from a variety of private and public 
sources, the majority of which come from non-STD clinic settings, such as private physicians 
and health maintenance organizations. CDC’s surveillance report includes data on the three 
STDs that physicians are required to report to the agency including chlamydia, gonorrhea and 
syphilis, which represent only a fraction of the true burden of STDs.
14
 
In 2010, a total of 1,307,893 cases of sexually transmitted chlamydia infection were 
reported to the CDC. This is the largest number of cases ever reported to CDC for any 
condition and is an increase of 5.1% compared with the rate in 2009. Rates of reported 
chlamydial infections among women have been increasing annually since the late 1980s, when 
public programs for screening and treatment of women were first established. In addition to the 
outrageous number of chlamydia reports, a total of 309,341 cases of gonorrhea and 13,774 
cases of syphilis were reported to CDC.
15
  Although seemingly low numbers in comparison to 
the number of sexually active Americans, from 2006 through 2010, syphilis rates increased at 
an alarming 134% among those aged 20 to 24 years.
16
 
                                               
13
 Sexually Transmitted Disease Surveillance, 2010, See www.cdc.gov/std/stats [Hereinafter STD 
Surveillance]. 
14
 Although these diseases are in fact curable with various antibiotics and procedures, this paper will 
focus only on incurable diseases.  These numbers are designed to give you an accurate representation of 
the only diseases that physicians are required to report.  Other common STDs such as human 
papillomavirus (HPV), genital warts, and genital herpes, are not reported to the CDC, and would not 
reflect an accurate number. 
15
 Id. 
16
 Id. 
 6 
Even more startling is that the infection rates of STDs in the United States are estimated 
to be between fifty and one-hundred times higher than the infection rates of other industrialized 
nations.
17
 
 
Despite the seriousness and prevalence of these diseases, many people continue to be 
careless, and fail to avoid transmission to their sexual partners.
18
 Until the sexual transmission 
of diseases is reduced, many people who have contracted sexually transmitted diseases will 
seek recompense in the courts from the people who infected them.
19
 The transmission of a 
venereal disease through sexual intimacy can form the basis for tort liability between sexual 
partners. As with most torts, the rationales for recognizing wrongful transmission claims 
include "redressing the violation of important norms, compensating victims, and discouraging 
unsafe behavior."
20
 Considering the epidemic proportions of sexually transmitted diseases, 
discouraging unsafe behavior under the guise of public health should be a top priority for courts 
in allowing these tortious transmission cases.  
 
II. Negligence 
Although many believe there is a moral and ethical duty to warn prospective sexual 
partners about a contagious medial condition, the essential question for the courts to consider is 
whether a person owes a legal duty to a sexual partner. Because there is no explicit answer 
from the United States Supreme Court, negligence is frequently asserted as the cause of action 
in cases for the transmission of a sexual disease.
21
 Negligence is conduct which falls below the 
                                               
17
 David J. Mack, Cleansing the System: A Fresh Approach to Liability for the Negligent or Fraudulent 
Transmission of Sexually Transmitted Diseases, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 647 (1999). 
18
 See supra n. 4. 
19
 See Mack, supra note17. 
20
 Michelle Mekel, Kiss And Tell: Making the Case for the Tortious Transmission of Herpes and Human 
Papillomavirus, 66 MO. L. REV. 929, 948 (2001). 
21
 Id. at 938.  
 7 
standard established by law for the protection of others against an unreasonable risk of harm.
22
 
This conduct may consist either of an act, or an omission to act, when there is a duty to do so.
23
  
An example of a failure to act may include failing to inform someone whom you may transmit 
a disease to.
24
 Although a few states have recognized negligent transmission of sexual disease 
since the late nineteenth or early twentieth century, courts all over the United States are now 
addressing this as an issue of first impression leaving to ones imagination the question of 
whether civil liability is appropriate for sexual disease transmission.
25
 
As in any negligence action, the following four essential elements must be established 
by a plaintiff in an action for the negligent transmission of a sexual or venereal disease:  
1. the existence of a legal duty; 
2. a breach of that duty; 
3. injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by the breach; and 
4. damages to the plaintiff.  
Obviously, where there is no legal duty, there can be no actionable negligence.
26
 
Therefore, a person who has a contagious STD, but abstains from any sexual activity, has no 
duty to disclose his or her medical condition. By definition, the infected individual has taken 
suitable safeguards to prevent any negligent transmission.  
                                               
22
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. 
23
 Id. at cmt. A. 
24
 As a practical matter, some jurisdictions allow a claim for both gross negligence as well as ordinary 
negligence if, under state law, gross negligence is distinct tort from ordinary negligence.  This section 
will only discuss ordinary negligence, a valid claim in all jurisdictions, since gross negligence is not a 
universally valid claim. 
25
 See Pollard, supra note 3, at 794. 
26
 AM. JUR. 2D, NEGLIGENCE § 89 (1989). 
 8 
Under the first prong, the notion of duty is founded on the responsibility each of us 
bears to exercise due care to avoid unreasonable risks of harm to others. In B.N. v. K.K., a case 
where a physician who knew he suffered from genital herpes entered into a sexual relationship 
with a nurse without informing her of his condition, and the nurse contracted the disease.
27
 The 
court held, that one who knew he or she had a highly infectious disease and could readily 
foresee the danger that the disease may be communicated to others, had a duty to take 
reasonable precautions by warning others or avoiding contact with them, to avoid transmitting 
the disease, and that a breach of this duty gave rise to a cause of action in negligence.
28
 As a 
consequence, the infected person has a duty to take reasonable precautions whether by warning 
others or by avoiding contact with them to avoid transmitting the disease.
29
 
Expanding on various courts opinions, Oklahoma in its 1997 decision established that 
an infected person may also have a duty to a third party who may become infected through a 
somewhat unforeseen chain of events.  In Lockhart v. Loosen, a wife who had contracted 
genital herpes from her husband brought a tort action against the woman with whom her 
husband had engaged in an extramarital affair.
30
  The wife alleged that the defendant knew that 
she had genital herpes when she engaged in the affair with her husband.
31
 The appellate court 
                                               
27
 538 A.2d 1175 (Md. 1988). 
28
 Id. at 1179. 
29
 Id.   
30
 Lockhart v. Loosen, 943 P.2d 1074 (Okla. 1997). 
31
 See also Meany v. Meany, 639 So. 2d 229 (La. 1994) In Meany, an action was brought by a former 
wife against a former husband for the negligent transmittal of genital herpes. There was enough 
evidence which led a jury to conclude that the defendant knew, or should have known that he was 
putting his former wife at risk of venereal disease by sexual contact where there was undisputed 
evidence that the defendant had contact with multiple sexual partners during a period of separation from 
the plaintiff. The plaintiff's first symptoms of infection occurred after reconciliation with the defendant, 
and when the plaintiff confronted the defendant with her diagnosis, the defendant disclosed that he had 
 9 
affirmed on all advanced theories of liability except negligence where it held that an individual 
who knows, or reasonably should know, that he or she has a sexually transmitted disease, and 
who has sexual relations during the period when he or she is infectious, owes a duty to warn his 
or her sexual partner of the contagion.
32
 The court added that such an individual also owes a 
duty to warn identifiable third persons with whom the individual knows the partner is 
copulating.
33
 
In their reason, the court explained how negligence is based on the breach of a duty on 
the part of one person to exercise care to protect another against injury, by failing to perform, 
or improperly performing, such duty, as a result of which the latter sustains an injury.
34
 They 
also explained that in the absence of such a showing, no liability can arise based on a claim of 
negligence. Although a seemingly low threshold, one must prove that a legal duty did exist.
35
 
Accordingly, people may be held liable for the negligent transmission of dangerous, 
communicable diseases,
36
 and a cause of action thus exists for the negligent transmission of a 
STD.
37
 
However, in C.A.U. v. R.L., the Minnesota court, in an attempt to determine the 
defendant's liability for transmitting the AIDS virus, held that the defendant's knowledge 
                                                                                                                                                     
experienced a problem with "dripping" for which he had sought medical attention but had failed to 
inform her. 
32
 Id. at 235. 
33
 Id. 
34
 In the above hypothetical, Anthony was negligent for failing to, or improperly notifying Maria of his 
STD.   
35
 See AM. JUR. 2D, NEGLIGENCE supra note 27, at § 82. 
36
 See C.A.U. v. R.L., 438 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); see also Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 
334 (Wyo. 1979). 
37
 McPherson v. McPherson, 712 A.2d 1043 (Me. 1998). 
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consisted only of what he perceived at the time of his relationship with the plaintiff.
38
 In their 
decision, they further held that the defendant was required only that his perception be 
reasonable under the circumstances, as he was not expected to perceive what was not apparent 
to him.  They found that at that time, AIDS were not prevalent and that it would not have been 
reasonable for the defendant to be on notice that he was at risk in transmitting the AIDS virus 
based on articles which he had read two years earlier in a magazine and newspaper, and the fact 
that he had a single homosexual experience.
39
 Accordingly, the court recognized and exception 
and found that the defendant was not liable for transmitting the AIDS virus to his fiancée at that 
time.
40
 
In addition to the four basic prongs that must be met for an ordinary negligence claim, 
some states require an additional element to have a successful claim for the negligent 
transmission of a STD. These jurisdictions require the defendant had knowledge, or should 
have known, that he or she had a contagious disease before having intercourse and transmitting 
the disease to his or her sexual partner.
41
 The courts deem an individual to have a "reason to 
know" of a particular disease if he or she has information that a person of reasonable 
intelligence would infer that the fact in question exists, or that such person would govern his or 
her conduct upon the assumption that such fact exists.
42
 They have found that one "should 
                                               
38
 See C.A.U. v. R.L., 438 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). 
39
 Id. 
40
 Id. 
41
 Although various states require some concealment by the defendant, this is not a requirement in all 
states and you will see below that there are numerous exceptions to this rule including assumption of the 
risk and contributory negligence to name a few.   
42
 RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, at § 12 (1); see also, M.M.D. v. B.L.G., 467 N.W.2d 645 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1991) The court found that a reasonable person with recurring sores on the genitals, who also has 
been told by a physician that a herpes culture may be advisable, should know there is a reasonable 
possibility that herpes has been contracted, and that such an acne-type condition on the genitals could be 
 11 
know" of a certain fact if a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the 
fact in question in the performance of his or her duty to another.
43
 The courts, by requiring 
defendants to only “reasonably believe," indicate that a person is on constructive notice when a 
given fact or combination of facts exists, that would cause a reasonable person to be aware of 
the possibility of spreading disease.
44
 
Therefore, the courts have established that one who knows, or should know, that he or 
she is infected with a sexually transmitted disease is under a duty to either abstain from sexual 
contact with others, or, at least, to warn a potential sexual partner about this risk of infection 
before engaging in a sexual relationship with that person.
45
 A breach of that duty will give rise 
to cause of action for tortious transmittal of the disease.
46
  
 Accordingly, if the defendant's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to 
another, the fact that the defendant neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the 
harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent the defendant from being liable to the 
plaintiff.
47
 In cases where there are issues of forseeability, a jury will often be used to 
determine if the harm of the defendant’s acts were actually foreseeable. However, as a matter of 
law, when the forseeability is clear, it is often times handled by the court. Typically one who 
knows that he or she has highly infectious disease can readily foresee the danger that the 
disease may be communicated to others with whom the infected person comes into contact, and 
the issue of forseeability can be quickly dismissed.   
                                                                                                                                                     
communicated to others through sexual contact, and has a duty to avoid sexual contact, or at least to 
inform potential sex partners about the genital sores and the physician's advice. 
43
 RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, at § 12 (2). 
44
 Id. at § 11. 
45
 Deuschle v. Jobe, 30 S.W.3d 215 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2000). 
46
 Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1989). 
47
 RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, at §§ 435 cmt. A, 435(1). 
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III. Excuse or Defense? 
An issue both plaintiffs and defendants face each day is the fact that the United States 
has 50 states each with their own laws, rules, and regulations.
48
 Because each jurisdiction is 
entitled to apply different rules, what may be a valid defense in one state, may only appear as 
an inadequate excuse in another. This section will explore various defenses as well as some 
asserted defenses that failed to meet the expectations of both the courts, and the jurors. 
 
§ 1: Lack of Knowledge 
Several jurisdictions have found an exception when the defendant is mistaken as to 
having a sexual disease.
49
  In these cases, the defendant's conduct may not amount to an 
intentional tort.
50 
 This is also known as the "lack of knowledge" defense, which requires 
defendants to adhere to a "reasonable" standard.
51
 For example, in C.A.U. v. R.L., the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals found that a man had no duty to warn his sexual partner of the risk 
of infection from AIDS because his contact with his sexual partner and the spread of the 
disease occurred before any significant knowledge of AIDS was widespread.
52
 
Similarly, in McPherson v. McPherson,
53
 a case in which a former wife sued her former 
husband for negligence and assault and battery after she learned that the defendant engaged in 
                                               
48
 The cases in this section are designed to provided explanations of several common issues and asserted 
defenses raised in STD cases. Note that the cases in this section are not applied universally nor are they 
necessarily exclusive to the particular jurisdiction where the case originated. 
49
 This mistake must be based on a good-faith belief.  
50
 RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, at § 892B cmt. C. 
51
 The Lack of Knowledge defense is currently the most successful to a claim for the infliction of a 
sexually transmitted disease. 
52
 C.A.U. v. R.L., 438 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). 
53
 McPherson v. McPherson, 712 A.2d 1043 (Me. 1998). 
 13 
an extramarital affair and subsequently infected the plaintiff with the human papilloma virus. 
Affirming the trial court's entry of judgment for the defendant, the appellate court held that, 
while Maine recognized a cause of action for the negligent spread of a sexually transmitted 
disease, the defendant, who was unaware that he was HPV-positive, was under no duty to 
protect the plaintiff from infection,
54
 and that the plaintiff could not recover for assault and 
battery where her sexual relations with the defendant were consensual.
55
 
 
§ 2: Substantial Mistake and Invalid Consent 
In some instances, a defendant may disclose a disease to a plaintiff. To the contrary, a 
defendant may also represent that he does not have a disease by failing to disclose a disease.  
However, if the defendant is aware that the plaintiff’s consent is given under a substantial 
mistake, the defendant is not entitled to rely on that consent.  This can occur when the plaintiff 
is unaware of the extent the harm the intercourse can actually cause due to the defendant’s 
failure to disclose a particular fact.  This defense also raises the issue of invalid consent.  
Invalid consent occurs when an individual is induced to consent “by a substantial mistake 
concerning the nature of the invasion of his interests or the extent of the harm to be expected 
from it and the mistake is known to the other or is induced by the other's misrepresentation,” 
the consent is ineffective.
56
 
This was the case in Kathleen K. v. Robert B., where the defendant relied on his limited 
representation to the plaintiff that he did not have a venereal disease.  The court held that by 
deliberately taking advantage of a plaintiff's ignorance, the defendant takes his or her chances 
                                               
54
 You will see below a different jurisdictions opinion where the facts of the case were similar, yet the 
outcome was entirely different.  
55
 McPherson v. McPherson, 712 A.2d 1043 (Me. 1998). 
56
 RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, at § 892B. 
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that the consequences that the plaintiff does not expect will occur, and the defendant becomes 
liable as if no consent had been given.
57
  The court also noted that if the defendant knows he or 
she has a sexually transmitted disease, this limited representation is no defense to an action by 
the plaintiff to recover damages for having contracted the disease from the defendant.
58
  By 
failing to fully disclose a disease, or the extent of a disease, a defendant surrenders his right to 
an informed consent defense.  Similarly, courts have rejected the defense of consent when it is 
obtained by express fraudulent misrepresentation. Thus, it is these jurisdictions opinions that 
the consent to intercourse should not bar recovery for a venereal infection because the consent 
given goes to the act of intercourse, not to the harmful contamination.
59
 
 
§ 3: Defendant’s Duty to Warn 
Recently, Iowa dealt with the defendant’s duty to warn at both its Supreme Court and 
Appellate Court. In its Appellate Court case of Rossiter v. Evans, the plaintiff sued the 
defendant for infecting her with a sexually transmitted disease after telling her he was disease-
free.
60
 The plaintiff was soon thereafter diagnosed with both strains of the human 
papillomavirus (HPV), one of which causes genital warts and the other cell abnormalities that 
can lead to cervical cancer. She alleged that the defendant infected her during their 18-month 
relationship and failed to warn her to take appropriate steps to protect herself from infection.
61
 
The defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence that he had, or should have known 
that he had a sexually transmitted disease, and without such knowledge, had no duty to warn 
                                               
57
 Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Cal. Ct. Ap 1994). 
58
 Id. 
59
 Louis A. Alexander, Liability in Tort for the Sexual Transmission of Disease: Genital Herpes and the 
Law, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 101, 128 (1984). 
60
 Rossiter v. Evans, 08-1815, 2009 WL 5125922 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009). 
61
 Id. 
 15 
the plaintiff or otherwise protect her from the transmission of these sexually transmitted 
diseases.
62
  
In drafting its opinion, the Iowa Appellate Court relied on its Supreme Courts opinion, 
which had been published earlier that year in Thompson v. Kaczinski, where the justices found 
that all that was required for an actionable claim of negligence was the existence of a duty to 
conform to a standard of conduct to protect others.
63
 They also noted as with many negligence 
cases, that an actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when his conduct creates a 
risk of physical harm.
64
  Relying on this opinion, the court was not persuaded by the defense 
offered by the defendant and the jury found that the defendant did not meet his duty of care; 
resulting in one of the largest verdicts of its kind.
65
   
   
§ 4: Assumption of Risk 
During consensual intercourse, absent any fraud on the part of any party, the parties 
involved often accept that they are equally responsible for whatever outcome may present 
itself. However, a frequently asserted defense in these cases is assumption of the risk.
66
 In these 
                                               
62
 Id.   
63
 Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829, 834 (Iowa 2009). 
64
 Id. at 834.  
65
 The Iowa jury found for the plaintiff in the amount of $1.5 million. The verdict form shows that 
$500,000 of Rossiter's compensatory damages were for future mental pain and suffering, while the 
punitive damages were for Evans's willful and wanton disregard of her safety. This large verdict came 
due to the fact that the jury rejected a battery claim which required the plaintiff to prove Evans 
deliberately infected her. As mentioned above, had this case been heard in a different jurisdiction, the 
outcome may have been drastically different.  
66
 In a typical negligence action, assumption of risk is a defense, which bars a plaintiff from recovery 
against a negligent tortfeasor if the defendant can demonstrate that the plaintiff voluntarily and 
knowingly assumed the risks at issue inherent to the dangerous activity in which he was participating at 
the time of his injury. Asserting this defense has obvious evidentiary problems because often times in 
these cases it’s one party’s word against the other. 
 16 
actions, the plaintiff must have known the risk existed, and been able to appreciate its 
unreasonableness.
67
 Therefore, in cases dealing with the transmission of a STD, when a 
plaintiff voluntarily contracts a STD from his or her sexual partner the plaintiff cannot recover 
for that harm.
68
  For example, in Doe v. Roe, the court held that persons who engage in 
unprotected sex, at a time of prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases, assume the risk of 
contracting those diseases, and that those who engage in intimate relationships thus have a duty 
to protect themselves adequately.
69
 
Similarly, when an individual infected with a sexually transmitted disease accurately 
informs his or her sexual partner of the affliction, and the partner understands the risk, and 
voluntarily consents to sexual activity, the partner has expressly assumed the risk of contracting 
the disease, and no liability should ensue for its transmission. Elements of the defense include 
the plaintiff's understanding of, and voluntary exposure to, a risk in circumstances that indicate 
a willingness to accept such risk.
70
 
 
However, several courts have not accepted this defense even in cases where there is full 
disclosure and consent.  These courts stress that public policy argues against the application of 
this doctrine, and these courts have distinguished between the consent to sexual activity and the 
consent to infection with venereal disease.
71
  A Florida court denied the application of this 
doctrine in a case where a former wife was infected with a sexually transmitted disease by her 
former husband during a period of attempted reconciliation.
72
 The Appellate Court held that 
while the issue was one of first impression in the state, consent to sexual intercourse did not 
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establish consent to be infected with a sexually transmitted disease, and therefore could not be 
asserted as a defense to battery.
73
 
 
§ 5: Contributory Negligence 
 It is well established that a defendant may be absolved from liability for a tort, if any 
negligence or recklessness involved was that of the plaintiff's, thus barring the plaintiff from 
recovering on the basis of his or her own contributory negligence.
74
  This rule is equally 
applicable to a plaintiff in a case concerning the transmission of a STD.  In these cases, if the 
plaintiff's negligence is a legally contributing cause of the plaintiff's harm, and there is no rule 
restricting the plaintiff's responsibility for it, the plaintiff’s claim may be denied.75  
Contributory negligence involves acting in such a way that a person of ordinary 
prudence would not do, or the failure to do something that a person of ordinary prudence would 
do, under the circumstances, to protect himself or herself from harm. Given the prevalence of 
sexually transmitted diseases in the general population, some may argue that a person who 
decides to enter into a sexual relationship should be expected to take reasonable precautions to 
avoid contracting the disease, at least to the point of questioning the partner in the relationship 
about the possibility of contracting the disease. No legal duty currently exists, however, which 
requires a person to question another about the state of his or her health.
76
  Additionally, 
whether an individual takes adequate measures to avoid transmitting a disease is currently an 
issue for the trier of fact.
77
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IV. Interspousal Immunity No Longer Applies To STDs 
Interspousal immunity historically barred tort claims brought by one spouse against 
another.
78
 Dating back centuries to common law, the doctrine of interspousal immunity was 
fashioned in accordance with the perception that a husband and wife were one legal entity, 
often times because it was perceived that a woman was the property of her husband. This 
archaic belief discouraged courts from entertaining these claims for tort against a husband or 
wife, finding it “morally and conceptually objectionable."79 In addition, the courts rationale 
rested on the theory that allowing suits between spouses would “clog courts with trivial suits, 
disrupt family harmony and result in collusive claims.”80 For example, in Bandfield v. 
Bandfield, a wife sued her former husband for infecting her during marriage with an incurable 
sexually transmitted disease.
81
 In this 1898 decision, the Michigan Supreme Court refused to 
permit the wife to maintain the suit, stating that such an action “would be another step to 
destroy the sacred relation of man and wife.”82 
However, numerous jurisdictions have revisited this issue since that time, the majority 
of which no longer bar sexual torts committed by ones spouse.
83
  It wasn’t until 1961 when the 
New Jersey Supreme Court ruled with the increasing minority of courts that began to abandon 
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complete interspousal immunity. The court, in its paramount decision, held that the surviving 
widow who was injured by the negligent driving of her deceased husband was entitled to bring 
an action against his estate.
84
 In its decision, the court noted that “the negligent infliction of 
injury by a husband upon his wife is a wrongful act” and that “it does not lose this quality 
merely because the wife is prohibited by the common law doctrine from enforcing liability for 
her damage.”85  
Since that time, New Jersey has reached the issue of interspousal immunity on several 
more occasions.
86
 In one instance, the court held that it was unconscionable that a person could 
escape liability for infecting a spouse with genital herpes or other sexually transmitted diseases 
by merely claiming that transmission occurred during the privileged sexual relations of 
marriage.
87
 The court logically reasoned that the defendant-husband could not simultaneously 
breach his marital relationship by engaging in extramarital intercourse, and then claim marital 
immunity for the consequences of his intentional misconduct.
88
  In these cases, the New Jersey 
courts traced the evolution of the interspousal immunity doctrine, where in its decisions it 
completely abandoned the doctrine of immunity with respect to interspousal torts with certain 
limited exceptions.  
Within the past few decades, numerous jurisdictions have looked to New Jersey’s 
holdings when confronting the controversial issue concerning the transmission of a sexually 
transmitted disease during a marriage.  For example, relying on New Jersey’s resolution, the 
New York court in its 1986 decision in Maharam v. Maharam, found that the plaintiff-former 
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wife, could seek compensatory and punitive damages from her former husband for alleged 
wrongful transmission of incurable genital herpes.
89
 Prior to this decision, New York relied on 
the historical doctrine of interspousal immunity and would likely have dismissed the claim. 
Simultaneously, the Supreme Court of Missouri was faced with a similar issue where a 
wife alleged that during the course of the parties marriage, her husband had negligently 
infected her with herpes.
90
 Relying on New Jersey’s decision, the Missouri court justices 
reasoned that it was not beyond the ability of the courts to, on a case-by-case basis, adjust the 
standard of care between married persons.
91
 It is evident that by doing so, the courts can better 
address the claims before them before reaching any predetermined conclusions.  
While in recent times interspousal immunity across the country remains far from 
consistent, the courts have overwhelmingly disfavored this historic doctrine. The majority of 
these states have based their decision on the notion that there is no reason that the types of 
lawsuits historically prohibited by this doctrine, would create unwarranted marital 
disharmony.
92
 
Although interspousal immunity began as a way of encouraging spousal harmony and 
preventing people from having to condemn, or being condemned by their spouses, the courts 
have shown that despite its survival in varying forms, interspousal immunity is no longer the 
doctrinal monolith it once was years ago.   
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V. Statute of Limitations 
 One of the most difficult questions presented in a case dealing with the transmission of 
a sexually transmitted disease has to do with the application of the statute of limitations as it 
relates to a plaintiff’s claim for negligence.93 Often times this defense is difficult to both prove 
and overcome, primarily because several venereal diseases have an incubation period and can 
lie dormant for an extended period of time.
 94
  Because of their latent effects, these diseases can 
remain undetected to plaintiffs for a number of years.
95
 Jurisdictions have taken various 
approaches in interpreting these statutes; some interpreting the statute broadly and looking to 
the reason the statute was created, while others apply it strictly, leading to splits throughout the 
country.   
 Typically issues arise with the statute of limitations when a plaintiff simply does not 
bring the action in a timely manner, or miss a filing deadline.
96
 In such instances, courts have 
typically not tolled
97
 statutes of limitations in tortious transmission cases.
98
 Following this strict 
adherence, numerous jurisdictions have found that in a claim for the negligent transmission of a 
sexually transmitted disease, the statute of limitations began to run at the time of injury. For 
example, the Texas Appellate Court found that the statute of limitations barred a wife's suit 
against her husband for personal injuries resulting from the husband's negligent transmission of 
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genital herpes to the wife because the right to sue for negligence occurs on the date the legal 
injury occurs.
99
 
 Similarly, Wyoming found in Duke v. Housen, that the defendant escaped liability for 
negligently transmitting gonorrhea to a female friend, but only because the statute of limitations 
had run.
100
 The court felt that the cause of action arose when the defendant first had sexual 
intercourse with the plaintiff.  The court noted that the statute of limitations began to run at the 
moment the defendant introduced into the body of the plaintiff the disease of gonorrhea. The 
court held that there was no question that under the law that the defendant was guilty of a 
tortious act of negligence, and the plaintiff was injured by the transmission of the disease.  
However, the court felt it was the initial exchange between where the disease was placed in her 
body, that the statute of limitations began to run, finding no exception to the statute.
101
   
In its reasoning, the court stated that statutes of limitation have long been a part of the 
jurisprudence of the United States,
102
 finding that the statute of limitations is a pragmatic 
device to save courts from stale claims, and spare citizens from having to defend from these 
claims when memories have faded and evidence is lost.
103
 Wyoming relied on its case law and 
held that statutes of limitation are arbitrary by their very nature and they are not judicially made 
but represent legislative and public policy controlling the right to litigate.
104
 The court reasoned 
that the statutes operate against even the most meritorious of claims and courts have no right to 
deny their application.
105
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Likewise, the Minnesota Court of Appeals found that the two-year statute of limitations 
on the husband's claims were not tolled during the time when he and his wife were married.
106
  
In this case, a husband brought an action against a former wife, where he alleged that she had 
negligently, intentionally, and fraudulently infected him with genital herpes.  The court held 
that the judgment entered in the dissolution action did not bar the husband from maintaining 
claims against his former wife under doctrine of issue preclusion, and by failing to do so, 
waived his right.    
On the other hand, various jurisdictions have found that a liberal application of the 
statute of limitations was better suited. These courts have acknowledged that a primary purpose 
behind statutes of limitation is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable 
time, thus allowing the opposing party a fair opportunity to defend.
107
 This entices litigants to 
pursue their causes of action diligently to prevent the litigation of stale claims and aids in 
weeding out stagnant and possibly frivolous or vexatious claims. 
 In order to equitably deal with the cases before them, these liberal courts looked to the 
Legislatures intention when drafting the statute.  They found that the Legislature has not 
defined in the statute of limitations when a cause of action "shall have accrued," and the matter 
has therefore been left entirely to judicial interpretation and administration.
108
  Therefore, these 
jurisdictions have found that the question at hand has changed.  These jurisdictions now inquire 
whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the considerations are such that a 
plaintiff should be regarded as having been “prevented” from filing his charges in timely 
fashion, and the statute of limitations tolled during that period.  
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The Supreme Court of the United States once held that “(s)tatutes of limitations are 
primarily designed to assure fairness to defendants,” and that the right to recovery would be 
“outweighed” where “a plaintiff has not slept on his rights but, rather, has been prevented from 
asserting them.”109 The Supreme Court further noted, “(t)he filing (of a lawsuit) itself shows the 
proper diligence on the part of the plaintiff which statutes of limitation were intended to 
insure.”110  In adherence with the Supreme Courts decision, these liberal courts began to apply 
the “discovery rule,” a limited exception to the statute of limitations.   
 The discovery rule was first announced in Fernandi v. Strully, a medical malpractice 
case.
111
 It provides that the statute of limitations begins to run when the injury is discovered, or 
in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, the injury should have been discovered. The 
rule responds to the unfairness of requiring a plaintiff sue to vindicate a non-existent wrong, at 
a time when injury is unknown and unknowable.
112
  
For example, in Fernandi, during the course of an operation, a medical wing nut had 
been negligently left in the plaintiff's abdomen. It was not discovered until more than two years 
thereafter, in excess of the strict reading of the statute of limitations. In its decision, the court 
held that the two-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until the plaintiff knew or had 
reason to know of the existence of the foreign object.
113
 
While Fernandi, expressly confined the discovery rule to foreign body malpractice 
actions, subsequent decisions have gone much further and have acknowledged the relevance of 
the doctrine whenever equity and justice have seemed to call for its application, including those 
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concerning the transmission of a sexually transmitted disease. In such cases, New Jersey courts 
have found it difficult to apply strictly a statutory period of limitations without considering 
conscientiously the circumstances of the individual case and assessing the Legislature's 
objective in prescribing the time limitation as related to the particular claim.
114
  
When faced with applying the discovery rule to the transmission of a venereal disease, 
New York similarly found that the diagnosis of a wife's sexually transmitted disease, as a 
matter of law, constituted sufficient knowledge to trigger the discovery rule and begin the 
statute of limitations period for an actual claim against her husband.
115
  In this case, the statute 
of limitations tolled until the date she was diagnosed, the first instance she knew, or had reason 
to know of the disease.   
Although various courts have been liberal in their application of the statute of 
limitations, many draw a fine line in order to ensure they do not to overstep the Legislatures 
purpose of the statute.  For example, the Tennessee Appellate Court in Potts v. Celotex, found 
that the discovery rule only applies in cases where the plaintiff does not, and cannot reasonably 
be expected to discover the harm giving rise to the cause of action.
116
  The court explained that 
the rule only tolls the statute of limitations as long as the plaintiff had no knowledge of the 
injury to the extent that a reasonable person would not have known.
117
 This requirement that a 
plaintiff exercise “reasonable care and diligence” is flexible, yet consistent with the 
Legislatures purpose for employing the statutes of limitations.    
A final defense a plaintiff may raise in response to the statute of limitations is that the 
defendant's fraudulent behavior caused the statute of limitations to run. An example of this 
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occurred when a husband's failure to admit that he had infected his wife with genital herpes was 
in fact a false representation. The court found that the husband and wife had a confidential 
relationship, and the wife was entitled to rely on the husband's denial.
118
  The court found that 
based on this relationship, the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions could 
be tolled.   
These exceptions to the strict adherence of the statute of limitations are essentially rules 
of equity, and like so many other equitable exceptions, have been developed as a means of 
mitigating the often harsh and unjust results that flow from a rigid and automatic adherence to a 
strict rule of law. On its face, it appears inequitable that an injured person who is unaware that 
he has a cause of action, should be denied his day in court solely because of fraud or his 
ignorance, if he himself had done no wrong. However, often times, this incorrectly seems to be 
the result when courts strictly apply decade old rules created by the Legislature. In these cases, 
it may be best for public policy to encourage courts to turn to the purpose of the statute in order 
to determine the statute of limitations.  
 
CONCLUSION 
It seems the most successful defense across the nation is the “I did not know I had it” 
defense.  Not only is this current negligence paradigm failing to deter irresponsible sexual 
behavior, but it actually discourages sexually active individuals from getting tested, because by 
avoiding testing, they also avoid any proof of knowledge of their disease.
119
  This “caveat 
emptor” standard in sex tort actions that has emerged fails to discourage irresponsible sexual 
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practices and has largely contributed to the major epidemic of STDs that has developed in the 
United States over the last thirty years.
120
  
Many courts are allowing a defendant’s ignorance to shield him or her from liability, in 
direct contradiction to the public policy designed to protect the majority as a whole. Rather than 
giving defendants a defense based on their own ignorance, the courts should hold these disease 
perpetrators accountable for their harm. By increasing the threshold that defendants must meet, 
and by adopting a firmer standard, courts could encourage potential disease perpetrators to be 
tested and behave responsibly to avoid disease transmission.
121
 To reach this ultimate goal, 
America could use its judicial system to develop a legal standard consistent with that of its 
social norms. 
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